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Secure positioning, a prover located at a specified position convinces a set of verifiers at distant 
reference stations that he/she is indeed at the specific position, is considered to be impossible if 
the prover and verifiers have no pre-shared data while dishonest provers have an arbitrary 
amount of pre-shared entanglement [Nature 479, 307-308 (2011)]. We argue here that current 
impossibility results for secure positioning are the upshot of not utilizing full powers of 
relativistic quantum information theory and show that secure positioning and hence position-
based quantum cryptography is possible if causal structure of Minkowski space time and 
quantum non-locality is used properly.    
 
1. Introduction 
Information theory deals with compressing, storing, processing and secure communication of 
data. It has deep connections with applied mathematics, computer science, electrical engineering, 
and physics while has important applications in number of other fields and multidisciplinary 
understanding. For example, its impact is crucial from mobile communication to internet, from 
neurobiology to space war, from thermal physics to understanding of black holes, and so on. The 
information theory has evolved the world progressively and securely through multiple ways such 
as source coding, channel coding, algorithmic information theory and information-theoretic 
security and measures of information.  
In today’s digital world, one of the most important areas in information theory is 
information-theoretic security such as one-time pad. Shannon’s mathematical information theory 
[1] is based on deterministic systems (0 and 1) for encoding information where security relies on 
following three main cryptographic techniques: (i) symmetric encryption, (ii) asymmetric 
encryption, and (iii) hashing along with message authentication codes and digital signatures. 
However, widely used classical algorithms for distribution of symmetric keys, generation of 
public-private key pairs and hence hashing or digital signature are only computationally secure – 
eavesdroppers with efficient technology (quantum computer) can easily break all these 
mathematically hard algorithms. 
On the other hand, newly developed Wiesner’s quantum information theory [2] encodes 
information over probabilistic microscopic physical systems called qubits 10 βαϕ += ; an 
atom, nuclear spins, or polarized photon. These encoded quantum systems are represented by 
unit vectors in Hilbert space and are processed through unitary operators. This framework of 
quantum information theory allows defining cryptographic tasks such as QKD [3] with 
information-theoretic security guaranteed by laws/properties of quantum physics such as 
uncertainty principle and no-cloning [4]. Moreover, quantum non-local correlations have high-
flying technological [5-8] and imperative impacts on foundation of quantum mechanics [9-11].  
However, an important task of secure positioning [12-15] is still an enigma in both 
classical [16] and quantum information theory [15,  
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17]. In a general position-verification scheme, a prover located at a specified position 
convinces a set of verifiers at distant reference stations that he/she is indeed at the specific 
position. In a formal notion of position-verification, different verifiers send a secret message and 
a key to decrypt that message in pieces to the prover. That is, each verifier sends a bit of key 
such that all the key bits and the message arrive at the position of the prover concurrently. If the 
prover decrypts the message correctly and sends the result to all verifiers in time, position-
verification scheme enables the verifiers to verify his position jointly. But if one or a set of 
dishonest provers, not at the specified position, intercept the communication and try to convince 
verifiers that they are at the specified position, a secure position-verification scheme enables the 
verifiers to reject it with high probability.  
After a number of attempts made for achieving secure positioning, currently it is known 
that if the prover and verifiers do not pre-share any data between them and dishonest provers 
have an arbitrary amount of pre-shared entanglement then secure positioning of the prover is 
impossible [15-17]. After a series of attempts and no-go theorem for secure positioning, some 
authors showed that position-verification can be possible in the following two models: (i) 
bounded storage model where dishonest provers’ quantum memory is bounded [15,18] or (ii) if 
the prover and verifiers have pre-shared data among them [19,20]. These result are useful 
somehow in the sense that position-verification gives a second layer of security, along with usual 
cryptographic techniques. However, we are not interested in such models here. 
These impossibility results put a real qualm on the following fascinating thoughts: Can 
journey of information theory from Shannon’s mathematical world “A mathematical theory of 
communication” to Wiesner’s quantum world “conjugate coding” enter into a new regime where 
information-theoretic security would be based solely on positions? In other words, can we 
achieve information-theoretic security where only credential of communicating parties is their 
position? We show here that such unconditionally secure position-based quantum cryptography 
is possible where sender and receiver have no pre-shared quantum/classical data while dishonest 
provers have efficient quantum technology and unlimited computational powers. 
Recently, we proposed that combination of quantum non-locality and causality allows 
relativistic quantum information theory to define a number of mistrustful cryptographic tasks 
[21-23]. For example, a new notion of oblivious transfer where both the data transferred and the 
transfer position remain oblivious, deterministic two-sided two-party secure computation, 
asynchronous ideal coin tossing with zero bias, and unconditionally secure bit commitment with 
arbitrarily long commitment time. These possibilities of wide range of cryptographic tasks 
motivate us to analyze also the possibilities of securing positioning in the same setup [24].   
We argue here that existing no-go theorem for secure positioning are the upshot of not 
utilizing full powers of relativistic quantum information theory and show that secure positioning 
is possible if causal structure of Minkowski space time and quantum non-locality is utilized 
properly. Considering the possibilities of non-local instantaneous computations, we show that the 
possibilities or impossibilities of secure positioning really depend on the construction of 
position-verification scheme and its communication modes. First we analyze the impossibility 
for secure positioning on the basis of quantum communication modes (used previously for 
position-verification), geometric structure of Minkowski space time and causality. We move then 
to show possibility conditions for secure positioning while using full powers of quantum non-
locality and causal structure of Minkowski space time. Finally, we propose a quantum scheme 
that guarantees unconditionally secure positioning and evades existing no-go theorem. 
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2. Causal structure of Minkowski space time and quantum non-locality 
Einstein's relativistic laws, no superluminal signaling and covariance, can be interpreted in a 
purely geometric way in Minkowski space time where the curvatures are all zero and the 
geodesics are world-lines over specific hyper surface in four-dimensional coordinate system 
(t,x,y,z). Before discussing possibilities and impossibilities of secure positioning, it is useful to 
revisit some of basic definitions and their terminologies in theory of relativity and quantum 
theory. 
Causality principle: The causality principle does not allow specially separated observers P1 and 
P2 in Minkowski space time to communicate with one another instantaneously by sending 
superluminal signals. They can exchange their information only at space time position lying 
somewhere in causal future of both observers.  
Quantum non-locality: Non-locality says that behavior of specially separated entangled quantum 
systems can depend on events occurring outside their respective light cones. It deviates from the 
understanding of locality where behavior of specially separated systems depends only on events 
occurring in their respective light cones. 
Localizable operators: A bipartite superoperator 21 UUU ⊗= is called localizable if it can be 
implemented by two distant parties P1 and P2 acting locally on their halves of shared quantum 
system 21 HH ⊗  such that  21 HH ⊗ transforms to )( 21 HHU ⊗ without any quantum/classical 
communication from P1 to P2 or from P2 to P1. In general, any tensor product 21 UUU ⊗= is 
localizable if P1 and P2 have pre-shared entanglement between them. In short, if P1 and P2 are 
space-like separated, they can transform shared quantum system 21 HH ⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗ on same 
space-like hyper surface through localizable superoperator 21 UUU ⊗= .  
Causal operators: A superoperator is said to be causal if it does not allow signaling between 
space-like separated parties. That is, a causal superoperator conveys information neither from P1 
to P2 nor from P2 to P1. Hence, any localizable superopertor is a causal superopertor.  
Semi-localizable operators: A bipartite superoperator 21 UUU ⊗= is called semi-localizable if it 
can be implemented by two parties P1 and P2 acting locally on their halves of shared quantum 
system 21 HH ⊗  such that  21 HH ⊗ transforms to )( 21 HHU ⊗
 
with one-sided communication 
only; from P1 to P2 or from P2 to P1. For example, if actions of P1 and P2 are null-like separated 
with P2 in causal future of P1, they can transform shared quantum system 21 HH ⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗
through semi-localizable superoperator 21 UUU ⊗= with one-sided communication from P1 to P2.  
Semi-causal operators: A superoperator is said to be semi-causal if it does allow one-way 
signaling only. That is, a semi-causal superoperator can convey information from P1 to P2 (say) 
but not from P2 to P1. Hence, any semi-localizable superopertor is a semi-causal superopertor. 
 
2.1 Quantum non-locality vs. causality principle:  
From principles of these two different theories, someone may worry about following question: 
Are these principles of causality and quantum non-locality contradictory? It is really a 
demanding question as for as foundational perspectives are concerned; basic structures of theory 
of relativity and quantum theory are fundamentally different. Hence, comparison or combination 
of these two theories needs some serious attention. However, answer to the above question is No 
and we try to explain this in the information theoretic viewpoint; information is physical and can 
only be encoded over physical systems. Hence these information carrier physical systems must 
obey the laws of physics [25].   
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Suppose observers P1 and P2 have components, 1H  and 2H respectively, of entangled 
quantum system 21 HHH ⊗= at distant sites on some space-like hyper surface }{ TtST == . 
Quantum non-locality says that P1 and P2 can transform this unknown quantum system 21 HH ⊗
 
to )( 21 HHU ⊗ instantaneously through local unitary operations. Now if 11 UUU ⊗= is a 
measurement operator, then respective measurement outcomes of P1 and P2 will be correlated. 
Both P1 and P2 surely can be aware of each other’s measurement results but no information has 
been transferred from P1 to P2 or P2 to P1.  
According to information theory, information can only be communicated between P1 and 
P2 at light speed through physical systems (photons) following world-lines over some null-like 
hyper surface nN connecting them. On the same footing, causality principle says that these world-
lines must be directed in their future light cones. In short, after combining quantum non-locality, 
information theory and causality principle, we come to the following conclusion for non-local 
quantum measurement operation in Minkowski space time: specially separated P1 and P2 on 
hyper surface }{ 11 TtST == can send their measurement outcomes at light speed to p on space-like 
hyper surface }{ 22 TtST == or to each other only at points q1 and q2 lying on space-like hyper 
surface }{ 33 TtST == such that 123 TTT >> . Hence non-local instantaneous measurements are not 
violating causality principle.   
Detailed discussion on observables of relativistic quantum theory, possibilities and 
impossibilities of non-local instantaneous measurements, necessary and sufficient condition for  
no-communication theorem, and rigorous review on relativistic quantum information theory can 
be found somewhere else [26-30].  
 
Figure 1: Specially separated P1 and P2 can perform localizable and hence causal operations on 
space-like hyper surface }{ 11 TtST == . However, they can only perform semi-localizable and 
hence semi-causal operations with p, q1 and q2 only. In summary, P1 and P2 cannot send 
information to each other on same hyper surface }{ 11 TtST ==  but they can send information to p 
and q1 or q1 on hyper surfaces }{ 22 TtST == and }{ 33 TtST == . However, p, q1 or q2 cannot send 
information to either P1 or P2.  
 
3. Security model for secure positioning 
For any general position-verification scheme, it is necessary to locate points from where verifiers 
send information to the prover, and where that information can be received and re-transmitted. 
For simplicity, let’s consider a 1+1 dimensional case in Minkowski space time where prover P 
and verifiers V1 and V2 occupy sites at points )0,( px , )0,( 1vx and )0,( 2vx respectively such that
5 
 
2/)( 12 vvp xxx −= . Moreover, suppose there can be two dishonest provers P1 and P2 at points
)0,( 1px and )0,( 2px respectively where δ−= pp xx1 and δ+= pp xx2 such that px<<δ . Now let’s 
denote information sent from verifiers to the prover for position-verification as pI while 
information replied by the prover to the verifiers as pI ′ .  
We assume that all the verifiers and provers (honest or dishonest) lie in the same inertial 
frame, computation (local or non-local) time at their sites is negligibly small, and they can 
communicate quantum/classical signals with each other bounded by no-signaling principle. 
These assumptions are necessary to deal quantum information in relativistic setup where 
simultaneity, no signaling, and Lorentz invariance have fundamental importance.   
 In general, verifiers V1 and V2 encode information pI over composite quantum system
21 HHH ⊗= where subsystem 1H is kept by V1 and 2H by V2. Here 21 HHH ⊗= can be a product 
system, entangled system, or component of some larger quantum system VHHHH ⊗⊗=′ 21 . The 
prover (or dishonest provers) receives systems 1H and 2H  from V1 and V2 respectively, applies 
some unitary transformations U on 21 HHH ⊗= depending on the scheme, and returns 
information pI ′ to both V1 and V2. The verifiers validate the exact position of the prover P if he 
replies correct information pI ′ consistent with )(HU within allocated time. 
If verifiers V1 and V2 send information pI encoded over system 21 HHH ⊗= from points
)0,( 1vx and )0,( 2vx respectively, the prover P can receive system 21 HHH ⊗= at point ),( pp txp
where cxxt vpp /)( 1−= while dishonest provers P1 and P2 can receive same system 21 HHH ⊗= at 
points ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp respectively where δ−== ppp ttt 21 . If the scheme is secure, it 
enables the verifiers V1 and V2 to receive information pI ′ back at points ),( 111 vv txv and ),( 222 vv txv
respectively such that pvv ttt 221 == with following guarantees: (i) only prover P at position to be 
verified ),( pp txp can send information pI ′ at both points ),( 111 vv txv and ),( 222 vv txv . (ii) Irrespective of 
pre-shared entanglement and non-local computation resources, dishonest provers P1 and P2 at 
positions ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp
 
respectively cannot send information pI ′ at both points ),( 111 vv txv
and ),( 222 vv txv . 
3.1. Localizable and causal computations: The possibilities or impossibilities of security 
requirements as described above really depend on the construction of position-verification 
scheme and the resources dishonest provers P1 and P2 have. Suppose P1 intercept quantum 
system 1H from V1 and P2 receives quantum system 2H from V2. Moreover, suppose they also 
have arbitrary amount of pre-shared entanglement in the form of system
21 ppp HHH ⊗= . First 
of all, P1 and P2 need to extract information pI ′  from quantum system 21 HHH ⊗=  through non-
local instantaneous computations. Secondly, whether P1 and P2 can respond valid information 
pI ′ to both verifiers in time or not depends on the construction of position-verification scheme 
and its communication modes.  
 Now the most relevant questions in the discussion of positioning at this stage is to ask (i) 
whether space-like separated P1 and P2 can have any localizable bipartite superoperator
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21 UUU ⊗= to transform system 21 21 pp HHHH ⊗⊗⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗ ? (ii) If yes, whether that 
superoperator is causal or not. The answer to the first question is yes, shared entanglement 
allows P1 and P2 to act 1U and 2U locally on their halves without any communication between 
them. That is, they can transform 21 HH ⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗ , without any classical communication, 
on the expense of their shared entanglement. This makes answer to the second question obvious; 
superoperator U will surely be causal since any localizable superoperator is a causal 
superoperator. Hence P1 and P2 can instantaneously transform system 21 HH ⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗ but 
can only extract information pI ′ somewhere in their causal future by communicating their 
classical local measurement outcomes.   
 In conclusion, possibilities of having localizable operators in dishonest provers toolkit 
leads to impossibilities of hiding information pI ′ from them. Hence, possibilities or 
impossibilities of secure positioning really depend on the construction of position-verification 
scheme and its communication modes.  
 
4. Impossibilities of secure positioning 
Theorem 1: Suppose dishonest provers P1 and P2 receive quantum systems 1H and 2H
 
from 
verifiers V1 and V2, which encode information pI , at points ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp respectively. 
In general, any position-verification scheme is insecure if it allows that the position to be verified
),( pp txp lies in the common casual future of points ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp . 
 
Proof: It can be seen from figure 2(b) that if dishonest prover P1 and P2 can receive encoded 
quantum system 21 HHH ⊗= such that ),( pp txp lies in their common casual future, they can 
apply some superopertor 21 UUU ⊗= locally at points ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp that transforms 
system 21 HH ⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗ instantaneously. Hence they can extract information pI ′ at points
),( 111 qq txq and ),( 222 qq txq , where δ+== pqq ttt 21 , in their causal future through mutual classical 
communication. In conclusion, verifier Vi cannot differentiate whether information pI ′ is returned 
from point ),( pp txp or ),( iqiqi txq . The position-verification schemes that cannot evade 
impossibility theorem 1 are shown in figure 2.  
Let’s write the theorem 1 in a more systematic way. Suppose verifiers iV  (i=1,2) and iV  
encodes information pI over quantum systems iH and iH
 
at points )0,( ivx and )0,( ivx respectively. 
Here 2=i
 
if 1=i
 
and vice versa. If prover receives encoded system iH and iH
 
at point ),( pp txp , 
and returns information pI ′ to both verifiers iV  and iV  at points ),( ivivi txv
 
and ),( ivivi txv , then  
theorem 1 can be restated as: 
 
Theorem 1: Suppose dishonest provers iP  and iP  receive quantum systems iH and iH
 
from 
verifiers iV  and iV , which encode information pI , at points ),( ipipi txp and ),( ipipi txp respectively. 
In general, any position-verification scheme is insecure if it allows that all points )0,( ivx ,
),( ipipi txp , ),( pp txp , ),( iqiqi txq , and ),( ivivi txv lie on same null-like hyper-surface inN . 
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             (a)                                                                                             (b) 
Figure 2: (a) 1+1 dimensional Minkowski space time representation of insecure quantum 
position-verification schemes. Dotted arrows from points )0,( 1vx and )0,( 2vx to point ),( pp txp  
represent information pI
 
encoded over systems 1H and 2H while dotted arrows from point 
),( pp txp towards its causal future represent information pI ′ . (b) 1+1 dimensional Minkowski 
space time representation of successful cheating strategy from dishonest provers P1 and P2. 
Dashed arrows represent non-local quantum computation (red) and classical communication 
between P1 and P2.  
 
4.1 Existing insecure position-verification schemes: Recently, a large number of attempts have 
been made to give secure positioning in relativistic quantum setup. However all these proposed 
schemes have been proved insecure against quantum attacks based on non-local instantaneous 
quantum computation [15,18]. These insecure position-verification schemes can be divided into 
two types based on whether provers’ unitary transformation U  is (i) single-qubit measurements 
and then classical communication [12,15,18] or (ii) qubit-wise quantum operations, Bell state 
measurement (BSM) [31], and then classical communication [13].  
In type (i), verifier V1 sends information pI encoded over 1H (either a pure quantum state 
or part of the maximally entangled pair) while verifier V2 sends information about measurement 
basis to the prover encoded over 2H . The prover measures the 1H  in the corresponding basis 
obtained from 2H and sends outcome pI ′ to both V1 and V2. If pp II =′ and prover replied within 
allocated time, verifiers validate the position of prover as genuine. In type (ii), both V1 and V2 
send halves 1H and 2H of their secret entangled pairs and classical information for corresponding 
unitary transformations 1U and 2U to the prover respectively. Prover is required to apply qubit-
wise transformation )( 2121 HHUU ⊗⊗ and then reply his/her BSM outcome to both V1 and V2. If 
BSM result of the prover is consistent with verifiers mutual communication, then position of the 
prover is verified otherwise aborted.  
As shown above in theorem 1, both of these approaches (i) and (ii) lead to insecure 
positioning since dishonest provers P1 and P2 can simulate their actions with the prover P. Hence 
the verifiers cannot be sure that whether they have received information from P at site ),( pp txp or 
from dishonest provers P1 and P2 at sites ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp . In short, if dishonest provers P1 
and P2 have pre-shared entanglement between them, they can break position-verification 
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schemes of type (i) and type (ii). S. Beigi and R. Konig showed that if dishonest provers posses 
an exponential (in n) amount of entanglement then they can successfully attack QPV scheme of 
type (i) and (ii) where n qubits are communicated [32]. It has also been shown by Burrman et al 
that the minimum amount of entanglement needed to perform a successful attack on QPV 
schemes of type (i) and (ii) must be at least linear in the number of communicated qubits [33]. 
 
5. Possibilities for secure positioning 
We have seen that position-verification schemes that allow verifiers, dishonest provers and the 
prover to apply unitary operations on same null-like hyper surface nN lead to impossibilities of 
secure positioning. So an obvious question would be: Can we restrict all verifiers, dishonest 
provers, and the prover to act unitary on same space-like hyper surface }{ TtST == ? Interestingly, 
answer to this question is positive. Quantum mechanics in the form of non-locality allows 
verifiers and the prover to apply unitary operations simultaneously on some space-like hyper 
surface while causality principles bounds dishonest provers to conclude measurement outcome 
of their non-local instantaneous computations on same space-like hyper surface. In other words, 
the joint outcome of quantum mechanics and theory relativity that “any localizable superoperator 
is a causal superoperator” leads to the possibilities of secure positioning. Unconditionally secure 
positioning can only be possible if any single-round quantum position-verification scheme 
fulfills following theorems 2 and 3 or their unified and more restricted version, theorem 4. 
 
Theorem 2: For secure positioning, the prover must be able to extract information pI ′
 
from 1H
and 2H at the earliest possible point ),( pp txp in the common causal future of both V1 and V2.  
 
Theorem 3: Suppose dishonest provers P1 and P2 receive quantum systems 1H and 2H  from 
verifiers V1 and V2, which encode information pI , at points ),( 111 pp txp ′′ and ),( 222 pp txp ′′ respectively. 
Unconditionally secure positioning is possible if and only points ),( 111 pp txp ′′ and ),( 222 pp txp ′′  are 
causally disconnected from point ),( pp txp , position to be verified. 
 
Theorem 4: Unconditionally secure positioning is possible if and only if verifiers send 
information pI and the prover extract information pI ′ on a same space-like hyper surface. 
 
6. Quantum scheme for secure positioning 
Here we show that causality principle can rescue single-round quantum position-verification 
schemes from dishonest provers having indefinite amount of pre-shared entanglement and a 
quantum scheme can be formulated that fulfill possibilities conditions in theorem 2 and 3 or 
theorem 4. Suppose verifiers V1 and V2 prepare quantum systems 11 HHv ⊗ and 22 HHv ⊗ at points
)0,( 1vx and )0,( 2vx respectively. Simultaneously, both V1 and V2 send components systems 1H
 
and 
2H
 
to P over null-like hyper surfaces connecting them to the prover without encoding 
information pI over quantum systems 1H and 2H .  
After time cxxtt vpp /)( 1−== , the prover receives component systems 1H and 2H and 
verifier V1 teleports [34] information pI over EPR channel 11 HHv ⊗ . Instantly, prover P measures 
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his/her half 1H , extracts information pI ′ and acts as follows: He/she teleports information to 
verifier V2 and simultaneously sends both information pI ′ and his/her BSM result of teleportation 
to both V1 and V2. The verifiers authenticate the position of the prover if pI ′ is consistent with 
both pI and non-local correlations generated by local measurements of verifiers and the prover on 
same space-like hyper surface }{ pt ttS p == . Schematics for secure position-verification scheme 
that can evade quantum attacks based on non-local instantaneous computations from dishonest 
provers P1 and P2 are shown in figure 3 (a). Detailed quantum scheme for secure positioning and 
its security analysis can be found in our recent work [24]. 
It can be seen from figure 3(b) that our scheme can evade impossibility conditions in 
theorem 1 and 1.1 securely. Non-local instantaneous computations of dishonest provers P1 and P2 
at points ),( 111 pp txp and ),( 222 pp txp cannot help dishonest provers to extract information pI ′ while 
being on the null-like hyper surface inN connecting verifier Vi with the prover P at point ),( pp txp .  
Similarly, our scheme fulfills possibility condition stated in theorem 4.  The point where 
V1 teleports information pI to P, the point where P process systems 1H and 2H through unitary 
transformations, and the point where V2 receives teleported information pI ′ from P, all lie on same 
space-like hyper surface }{ pt ttS p == . As a result, any localizable operator 11 UUU ⊗= , which 
can transform system 21 HH ⊗ to )( 21 HHU ⊗ at points ),( 111 pp txp ′′ and ),( 222 pp txp ′′ lying on same 
hyper surface }{ pt ttS p == , does not allow dishonest provers P1 and P2 to reply information pI ′ to 
both V1 and V2 in time. That is, it can be seen from figure 3(b) that in quantum position-
verification scheme built on some space-like hyper surface, dishonest provers can only extract 
information pI ′ at points )2,( 21 pp txq and )2,( 22 pp txq and hence can reply correct information to both 
V1 and V2 not before δ+pt2 .   
Although, possibility condition stated in theorem 2 is necessary for any quantum 
position-verification scheme, however, it has special importance while considering tasks on 
some space-like hyper surface. In our scheme for secure positioning, if V1 and V2 are not on 
same space-like hyper surface, dishonest provers P1 and P2 can simulate their actions with the 
prover P through semi-localizable operations. For example, in our teleportation-based QPV 
scheme, dishonest provers P1 and P2 can manage to have a whole system 21 HH ⊗ at site of P1(or 
P2) who can then send information pI ′ to P2(or P1) through semi-localizable operations. 
Finally, teleportation is the necessary quantum communication mode to insure possibility 
conditions stated in theorem 3 or theorem 4 that guarantees security against localizable 
operations of P1 and P2. Since provers’ site can have some finite radius δ, possibility condition 
stated in theorem 3 can be insured without restricting verifier V1 on same space-like hyper 
surface }{ pt ttS p == . That is, secure positioning is possible even if V1 teleports information pI at 
time t where pp ttct ≤<− /)( δ .  
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                     (a)                                                                                     (b) 
Figure 2: (a) 1+1 dimensional Minkowski space time representation of secure quantum position-
verification schemes. Dotted-dashed arrows from points )0,( 1vx and )0,( 2vx to point ),( pp txp  
systems 1H and 2H while dotted arrows (horizontal) represent information pI
 
teleported from 
verifier V1 to prover at point ),( pp txp
 
and information pI ′  from point ),( pp txp  toward its causal 
future. (b) 1+1 dimensional Minkowski space time representation of unsuccessful cheating 
strategy from dishonest provers P1 and P2. Dashed arrows represent non-local quantum 
computation (horizontal) and classical communication between P1 and P2. 
 
7. Discussion 
We showed that an enigma of secure positioning in both classical and quantum information is 
solvable even if sender and receiver have no pre-shared quantum/classical data while dishonest 
provers have efficient quantum technology and unlimited computational powers. We showed that 
previously existing no-go theorem for secure positioning is the upshot of not utilizing full powers 
of relativistic quantum information theory and prove that secure positioning is possible if causal 
structure of Minkowski space time and quantum non-locality is utilized properly.  
By using geometric structure of Minkowski space time, we analyzed the impossibility for 
secure positioning on the basis of quantum communication modes and causality principle. We 
also showed that secure positioning is possible and comprehensively outlined possibility 
conditions that have to be followed by every secure position verification scheme.  
The outcome can be summarized as follows. Single-round quantum position-verification 
schemes based on qubit-wise unitary transformations on some null-like hyper surface are proved 
to be insecure. In the existing quantum communication modes, only option for achieving 
unconditionally secure positioning is teleportation. Teleportation is necessary and sufficient 
mode for formulating secure positioning where bother verifiers and the prover apply unitary 
transformations on same space-like hyper surface. Here, causality principle from the theory of 
relativity rescues the teleportation-based quantum position verification constructed over some 
space-like hyper surface. If the verifier teleports and the prover receive information at some 
space-like hyper surface, then any quantum operation that allows space like-separated dishonest 
provers P1 and P2 to communicate and extract encoded information is not causal and hence not 
physically implementable. 
This possibility of secure positioning would have applications in long distance 
communication and other quantum tasks. For example, if prover P is considered to be a quantum 
repeater, then the parties V1 and V2 can use its secure positioning for long distance 
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communications. Instead of sending message directly, V1 sends encrypted message to P who 
then passes the message to V2. If V1 and V2 agree on the position verification of P, then V1 can 
communicate and reveal message to V2. Moreover, some quantum tasks such as quantum 
multiplayer games strictly require that certain players (dishonest in general) are not allowed to 
communicate with each other. Non-relativistic quantum information theory does not guarantee 
this security requirement for multiplayer games. However, relativistic quantum information and 
hence secure positioning can ensure that each player is performing local unitary operations from 
some specified position and is restricted from communication with other players through 
causality principle.  
Finally, we assumed that the verifiers and provers, honest or dishonest, lie in same 
inertial frame. The assumption is quite acceptable for many practical applications such as 
communication between military bases, communication between a customer and bank in nearby 
vicinity, automatic toll collection at some specified locations etc.  
However, to make it more general from moving provers on earth to earth-satellite 
communications, we need to generalize this procedure where Lorentz invariance is necessary 
ingredient. Our proposed possibility conditions for secure positioning are in fact an important 
step towards this generalization. These conditions guarantee secure positioning by bounding 
verifiers and the prover to transmit and receive on same space-like hyper surface in specific 
order. This bound on ordering of quantum unitary operation is an important step for Lorentz 
invariance.  
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